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Coverage Of
Uninsured
Motorist
Endorsement
by Andrea Gentile

The Court of Appeals recently considered the scope of an insurance company's liability under its own uninsured
motorist's endorsement. By resolving an
ambiguous insurance contract in favor of
the insured, the court extended coverage
beyond the probable intent of the insurer
McKoy v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., Inc.,
281 Md. 26,374 A.2d 1170 (1977).
Mrs. McKoy, a Maryland resident insured by the defendant company, was
driving in the District of Columbia when
she was struck by a negligent D.C.
motorist. Thereafter, McKoy began her attempts to recoup damages for personal
bodily injuries which she alleged to be
$29,000.
The problems confronted in this case
resulted from the fact that financial
responsibility laws regarding auto insurance vary from state to state. The
minimum requirement for coverage in the
District of Columbia for bodily injury
liability insurance is $10,000 per person
with an aggregate of $20,000 for all persons injured as a result of the same occurrence. On the other hand, Maryland demands a minimum of $20,000 coverage
per person and an aggregate of $40,000
to insure the injuries of all of the persons
involved. Further, Maryland requires
Uninsured Motorist Protection Coverage
with the same $20,000/$40,000 limits.
Maryland views any motorist, such as the
Washington driver in this case, as uninsured if he has coverage of less than the
required Maryland limits of
$20,000/$40,000, even though the District's limits are satisfied. Thus, Mrs.
McKoy was entitled to collect under the
Uninsured Motorist provisions of her

policy for an amount in excess of the
tortfeasor's $10,000 coverage.
The GEICO Insurance Company paid
the $10,000 for which it had assumed
liability as the insurer. Since her injuries
exceeded this amount, Mrs. McKoy then
submitted a claim to Aetna to recover the
remainder of the damages under her Uninsured Motorist (UlM) coverage. At this
point a difference of opinion arose as to
the amount of Aetna's liability. Aetna
contended that it was obliged to pay
McKoy no more than $10,000; that under
the terms stated in the Aetna U/M endorsement, the company was allowed to
"set-off" the $10,000, already paid to
Mrs. McKoy by GEICO, against the
$20,000 face amount of the endorsement.
Aetna based its contention on the
language contained in Part III of its UlM
endorsement which reads as follows:

III LIMITS OF LIABILITY
(d) Any amount payable to an insured
under the terms of this insurance shall be
reduced by (1) all sums paid to such insured for bodily injury or property
damage by or on behalf of the person or
organization legally liable therefore.
Mrs. McKoy found this objectionable
and brought an action in the Prince
Georges County Circuit Court for a
declaratory judgment to determine the
amount of the Uninsured Motorist
coverage provided by her Aetna policy.
Plaintiff McKoy argued that the sole
purpose of the "set-off" clause was to prevent a double recovery of damages; that
the amounts recoverable from other
sources were to be subtracted from the
total damages incurred but that they were

not to affect the face amount of the
policy. Simply stated, she felt that where
she sustained damages for bodily injury
amounting to $29,000, of which $10,000
was paid by the "responsible person or
organization," and she carried a $20,000
limit on her own policy, she should be entitled to recover the remaining $19,000
worth of damages from her insurer.
The Circuit Court rejected Mrs.
McKoy's argument and in agreeing with
AETNA, stated that McKoy could claim
only $10,000 from the insurer because
despite total tiamages of $29,000 the
total amount of Aetna liability ($20,000)
was to be reduced, under the set-off
clause of the Uninsured Motorist provision, by the $10,000 collected from the
wrongdoer's insurer.
McKoy then carried the dispute to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed.

In determining the extent of Aetna's
liability under their own contract, the
Court looked to the language set forth in
the U/M endorsement attached to the
plaintiff's policy.
Pertinent to the disposition of the case
are three parts.
First, Part I outlines the primary
liability of Aetna to Mrs. McKoy. The
relevant language reads: "The Company
will pay all sums which the insured or
[his] legal representative shall be legally
." (emphasis adentitled to recover.
ded).
Second, Part I1I(a) sets forth the dollar
limit of Aetna's liability for inj uries (to
anyone person covered by the policy)
suffered in an accident "arising out of the
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ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured auto." Under this provision of
McKoy's policy, Aetna limits its dollar
liability to a single injured person
(McKoy) at $20,000.
Third, Part lII(d) , the set-off clause
upon which Aetna relied, also modifies
the primary liability of Part I by indicating
that "any amount payable to the insured
under the terms of [the policy] shall be
reduced" by the amount of sums paid to
the insured "on behalf of the tortfeasor."
See Id., at 30, 374 A.2d at 1172.
There was no dispute that Part III (d)
meant that the $10,000 from the D.C.
driver's insurance already paid to Mrs.
McKoy should act as a set-off. The issue
became one of determining the proper
referent of the phrase "any amount payable." If this meant the total amount corresponding to the total damages, $29,000,
suffered by Mrs. McKoy, then the
$10,000 set-off would leave Aetna with a
$19,000 obligation. On the other hand, if
those words in III (d) referred to the
amount payable from Aetna to McKoy,
$20,000, then the application of the setoff would leave Aetna with a mere
$10,000 obligation.
In holding for Mrs. McKoy, the court
stated that both lII(a) and III (d) were independent modifiers of the total amounts
payable clause in Part I. Thus, the set-off
did not reduce the Aetna limit of liabilit~,
but the total sums to which that liability
was to be applied, i.e., the outstanding
amount payable to plaintiff McKoy after
the application of the $10,000 paid on
behalf of the tortfeasor.
In order to remove any doubt about the
correctness of the result, the court stated:
Even assuming that the interpretation
of the policy urged upon us by Aetna is
an equally reasonable one, this would,
at best, create an ambiguity. In such
Situations, ambiguities are resolved
against the author of the instruPenn., Etc., Ins. Co. v.
ment.
Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 537, 168 A.2d
525,528 (1961).
281 Md. at 31,374 A.2d at 1173.
The decision of the court rested entirely upon the construction of the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement issued by
Aetna. To avoid this result in future cases
involving the Uninsured Motorists
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coverage, Aetna could restructure the
language of its endorsement specifically
to limit the coverage. While it is evident
that the court intended that an insured
benefit from as much of her insurance as
possible, it could have reached a more enduring result based upon substantive law
rather than contract construction had it
dealt with the alternative argument that
the set-off clause was void under MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A §541. This section requires
that insurers issuing policies for Maryland
drivers provide a minimum of $20,000
U!M coverage for each policy, and a court
could construe the Code to require application of the $20,000 obligation to the
balance of "any amount payable" to an
insured after application of a set-off. The
court chose not to reach this question,
and thus left this case vulnerable to isolation on its facts. See id., at 28 n.l, 374
A.2d 1171 n.l.
McKoy articulates well the problem of
uninsured motorists insurance protection--a problem acute in Maryland, which
entertains more than its share of foreign
drivers who are without sufficient
coverage of their own. It also appears that
the result in this case works a two-edged
economic sword, with one blade cutting
costs to an insurance consumer like
McKoy by holding an insurance company
to its full obligation in the manner provided by this court. The other edge,
however, narrows company profit margin
resulting in higher insurance rates.

Terry
Examined
by James F. Kuhn
The Court of Special Appeals has rendered invalid an investigatory stop based
solely on information received in a police
radio broadcast absent other indications
of present danger and criminal activity.
Price v. State, 37 Md. App., 248, 376
A.2d 1158 (1977).
On April 5, 1975, a Prince George's
County police officer on routine patrol
received a radio broadcast that an armed

robbery suspect, James Price, was
believed to be driving a silver 1966
Cadillac and that he was in possession of a
shotgun, stolen goods, and narcotics. The
officer, having sighted an automobile
matching the description given in the
broadcast down to the tag number, approached the driver when he stepped from
the car in a gas station and conducted a
patdown of the driver who at that time
identified himself as James Price. This
limited search, conducted on the basis of
the radio alert alone, produced a knife
from the person of the appellant. He was
arrested on a weapons charge and subsequently convicted on separate charges,
relating to a robbery which had occured
three weeks earlier on the basis of evidence seized by a second officer while
searching the car in the gas station.
Price's contention on appeal was that the
state had failed to establish the necessary
"reasonable suspicion" to justify his being
stopped and frisked for weapons, thus violating rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.
Nine years ago, the Supreme Court
made clear in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
(1968), that police officers may "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behaviour even though there is no
probable cause for making an arrest" and
that where the officer "observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous" he
may conduct a limited frisk for weapons
by patting down the outer clothing of the
suspect. 392 U.S. at 22. Terry requires
only that the officer be able to point to
specific and articulable facts that would
justify a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and presents a threat to
the officer or bystanders.
In Price, the state argued that the patdown was justified under the Terry
doctrine in that a police broadcast that a
suspect is armed and dangerous in and of
itself justifies a patdown for weapons even
if it does not constitute probable cause for
arrest. The danger of too broad a reading

